Recent developments in Ukraine have once again highlighted the importance of the independence of anti‑corruption institutions. The public’s awareness of the “hygienic” necessity of such independence was clearly demonstrated during the so‑called “Cardboard Revolution.”
An equally significant indicator has been the reaction of European partners to destructive legislative initiatives and the increased investigative activity of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) targeting detectives of the National Anti‑Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Ultimately, the so‑called “Mindichgate” vividly illustrates that it is likely only NABU that is capable of investigating corruption of such magnitude, owing both to its specialization and its independence.
NABU’s independence has many dimensions: structural and operational autonomy, procedures for appointment and dismissal of its Director, the availability of sufficient powers necessary for effective operation (special operational‑search activities, investigative tools, access to financial information), and the availability of adequate financial and infrastructural resources, among others.
One of the most essential guarantees of NABU’s independence is its exclusive investigative jurisdiction. It is crucial that other authorities are neither able to duplicate proceedings falling under NABU’s jurisdiction nor seize them from NABU.
The exclusive jurisdiction of NABU is enshrined in Article 216(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC), yet it is systematically violated at the departmental level and is continually subject to external encroachments.
Attempts to Amend Legislation Amid “Maski‑Show” Tactics
NABU commenced investigations in late 2015, and by October 2016 a draft law (No. 5212) had already been registered in Parliament proposing to allow the Prosecutor General, “in exceptional cases,” to transfer cases falling under NABU’s jurisdiction to another investigative body.
At the end of November 2017, the SSU and the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) arrested NABU undercover agents, searched a secret apartment, and triggered an information scandal during which the PGO disclosed personal data and publicly named several undercover NABU agents.
In 2023, there was another attempt to encroach on NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction over high‑level corruption crimes—an initiative by the President of Ukraine to equate top corruption with treason and transfer NABU cases to the SSU.
And then the most recent events: On 21 July 2025, the SSU and the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), with support from the Office of the Prosecutor General, conducted more than 70 searches targeting NABU and SAPO employees.
The following day, the Parliamentary Committee on Law Enforcement, at an extraordinary meeting, introduced amendments restricting the work of NABU and SAPO into draft law No. 12414, which originally concerned issues related to persons missing under martial law.
The amendments, inter alia, granted the Prosecutor General the authority to change NABU’s investigative jurisdiction. The same day, Parliament adopted the bill with 263 votes, and the President signed it into law—Law No. 4555.
On 24 July 2025, the Verkhovna Rada published presidential draft law No. 13533, marked as urgent.
On 31 July 2025, Parliament passed the law and the President signed it. Draft law No. 13533 (now Law No. 4560‑IX of 31.07.2025) is essentially a mirror reversal of Law No. 4555, restoring the status quo.
It is important to emphasize that the reinstated prohibition on the Prosecutor General unilaterally altering NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction serves, among other things, as a safeguard against political interference. The appointment of a Prosecutor General without a law degree has arguably demonstrated that this position currently embodies far more political than professional substance.
Departmental Interference
Interference in NABU investigations has taken various forms:
– parallel investigations;
– transferring cases from NABU to other investigative bodies;
– refusal to transfer cases to NABU.
Frequently, other investigative bodies initiated proceedings clearly falling within NABU’s jurisdiction. Another method of manipulating jurisdiction was to classify an offense as a different crime, outside NABU’s investigative mandate.
To dispel any illusion that this shameful phenomenon reflects healthy interagency competition driven by a desire to “improve performance,” it is important to understand the consequences of violating investigative jurisdiction—especially NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Beyond the obvious risk of another authority deliberately burying a case, there are less visible but equally damaging consequences: insufficient qualification of other investigative bodies, inevitably leading to delays and ineffective investigations.
This dynamic is illustrated not only by dry statistics but also by the stable practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. For example, in its recent judgment of 13 November 2025 in Ivchenko v. Ukraine (application No. 10095/24), the ECtHR found violations of Article 6 §1 and Article 13 of the European Convention due to excessive duration of criminal proceedings (ongoing since 2014) and lack of an effective remedy to challenge such delays.
The harmful consequences of failing to respect proper jurisdiction emerged as early as NABU’s first years.
In June 2016, the Kyiv Court of Appeal overturned a lower court’s order detaining a mayor suspected of accepting a €1 million bribe on grounds that the investigation had been conducted by an unauthorized investigative body.
In May 2017, a local court refused to commence trial against a Deputy Minister of Health accused of accepting an improper benefit, returning the indictment to the prosecution primarily due to jurisdictional violations (the case was investigated by local prosecutors, not NABU under SAPO’s supervision).
But this is not all. There are at least two less obvious but critically important consequences capable of nullifying any investigation:
- Violation of investigative jurisdiction leads to violation of judicial jurisdiction, thereby calling into question the validity of any resulting court decision.
- Evidence obtained in violation of investigative jurisdiction may be deemed inadmissible, meaning it cannot be relied upon to substantiate charges.
Impact of Investigative Jurisdiction on Judicial Jurisdiction
Proper determination of judicial jurisdiction ensures a person’s right to a tribunal “established by law” under Article 6 §1 of the Convention, Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.
Jurisdictional rules also safeguard the equality of all persons before the law and courts (Article 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine and Article 10 CPC).
Consequently, a violation of judicial jurisdiction results in the quashing of a court decision (Article 412(2)(6) CPC), and the entire proceeding may be deemed unfair under Article 6 of the Convention (e.g., ECtHR judgment in Feldman v. Ukraine, 08.07.2010, applications Nos. 76556/01 and 38779/04).
The jurisdictional formula of the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC) (Article 33‑1 CPC) is directly linked to Article 216(5) CPC—NABU’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has likewise held that HACC’s subject‑matter jurisdiction must be strictly aligned with NABU’s investigative jurisdiction.
The jurisdictional formula of the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC) (Article 33‑1 CPC) is directly linked to Article 216(5) CPC—NABU’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has likewise held that HACC’s subject‑matter jurisdiction must be strictly aligned with NABU’s investigative jurisdiction.
However, this must be interpreted with one crucial qualification: a violation of NABU’s investigative jurisdiction should not eliminate HACC’s judicial jurisdiction, as otherwise one violation would automatically generate another, making remediation impossible.
A vivid example is the case against a former Deputy Chair of the Higher Commercial Court, investigated by SBI investigators, who sought judicial authorizations from the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv.
HACC’s Appeals Chamber annulled the Pechersk court’s order imposing pre‑trial detention, including due to jurisdictional violations.
Since Article 216(5) CPC defines NABU’s investigative jurisdiction, recognizing HACC’s judicial jurisdiction over a case effectively acknowledges that the case should have belonged to NABU.
Thus, violations of NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction inherently lead to breaches of judicial jurisdiction.
Admissibility of Evidence
Article 62(3) of the Constitution of Ukraine states that an accusation cannot be based on evidence obtained unlawfully.
The Constitutional Court, in its decision of 20 October 2011 (No. 12‑rp/2011), differentiated between evidence obtained:
- with violations of constitutional rights; and
- by an unauthorized person. Both constitute independent grounds for inadmissibility.
This is reflected in Article 86(1) CPC: evidence is admissible only if obtained “in accordance with the procedure established by this Code.” A logical consequence is that evidence obtained outside such procedure is inadmissible—a principle the courts have conceptualized as compliance with “proper legal procedure.”
The Supreme Court has established that conducting a pre‑trial investigation in violation of investigative jurisdiction—i.e., by unauthorized bodies—constitutes a substantial violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and leads to the inadmissibility of evidence.
This doctrine is most comprehensively articulated in the judgment of the Joint Chamber of the Criminal Cassation Court (JCCC) of 24 May 2021 in case No. 640/5023/19.
The Joint Chamber held that investigative jurisdiction under the CPC is strict and does not allow prosecutorial discretion. Its strategic purpose is to guarantee a person’s right to an objective and impartial investigation and, ultimately, to a fair trial under the Convention.
This position has been consistently applied in Supreme Court decisions throughout 2021–2024 and constitutes the mainstream approach.
However, a parallel (and currently smaller) line of Supreme Court practice relies on reasoning from the Grand Chamber decision of 31 August 2022 in case No. 756/10060/17 and another CCU decision in case No. 761/34746/17—both unrelated to the context. Under this “apocryphal” doctrine, a mere violation of investigative jurisdiction is insufficient; courts must additionally establish investigator bias.
If investigators follow CPC procedures, jurisdictional violations supposedly do not affect admissibility.
What Do Scholars Propose?
The unexpected plurality of Supreme Court approaches correlates with an equally diverse spectrum of academic views, ranging from:
– legislatively prohibiting courts from deeming evidence inadmissible due to jurisdictional violations,
to
– explicitly codifying inadmissibility of such evidence in the CPC.
An intermediate proposal is to enhance predictability by shifting the assessment of jurisdictional violations to the pre‑trial stage and assigning this function to investigating judges.
Thus, the problem exists and currently lacks a definitive solution. But unless the Supreme Court’s mainstream practice or legislation changes, those who violate investigative jurisdiction—especially NABU’s exclusive jurisdiction—face extremely bleak judicial prospects. Given that this cannot be unknown to them, one is prompted to assume that such procedural adventurism may pursue far from constructive goals.
Conclusion
Civil society appears to have recognized the importance of safeguarding the independence of anti‑corruption institutions. In a democracy, this should encourage—not deter—the government from strengthening, or at least not overtly undermining, such independence.
Yet public trust in anti‑corruption bodies remains low. Perhaps this will change once “Mindichgate” concludes in line with societal expectations.
As a practitioner in criminal procedure, I am far from enamored with the performance of the anti‑corruption vertical; yet I must acknowledge that these institutions currently remain the best available in Ukraine. This paradox evokes an unexpected historical parallel.
Inquisitorial tribunals—now associated with brutality and coercion—were historically introduced to make criminal proceedings more predictable, professional, standardized, and somewhat more humane compared to local secular courts that still relied on ordeals, duels, mob justice, and chaotic procedures.
Similarly, the work of anti‑corruption institutions markedly differs from the practices of other law enforcement bodies, some of which still seem unable to move past the procedural “innovations” of the 13th century.
The key is to avoid halting progress under pressure from unfriendly “neighbors.”
Source: Ukrainska Pravda