Ruslan Radchenko
Attorney, ESQUIRES
The National Revenue Strategy until 2030 (the “NRS”), adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine at the end of 2023, effectively launched the implementation of a large-scale reform of the national tax system. This document serves as a roadmap for reforming the tax and customs systems and contains a list of measures which, in the Government’s view, constitute the necessary prerequisites for improving tax and customs administration procedures to ensure the country’s fiscal capacity in the medium term.
Among the key strategic objectives of the NRS are: ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability by maintaining an adequate level of revenue mobilization and reducing the need for external financing; aligning Ukraine’s legislation with EU law and fulfilling international obligations in the field of tax and customs policy and administration; strengthening integrity and increasing trust in supervisory authorities through enhanced anti-corruption mechanisms, improved transparency and efficiency of administrative procedures. Another separate focus area is the development and implementation of modern digital solutions aimed at improving compliance with tax legislation by both taxpayers and supervisory authorities.
The Government declares that the ultimate goal of the National Revenue Strategy is the creation of a predictable and foreseeable, fiscally neutral tax system that takes into account the requirements related to Ukraine’s integration into the global economy as a reliable tax jurisdiction and provides taxpayers with the ability to properly fulfill their obligations, which is essential for the country’s recovery and sustainable development.
At the same time, certain implementation tools proposed within the NRS—despite the ambitious nature and systemic objectives—have raised well‑founded concerns among the domestic business community and experts.
Reform of the Simplified Taxation System (STS)
According to the NRS, the reform of the simplified taxation system envisions several key changes which, taken together, would fundamentally transform the existing model.
First, the Government plans a gradual increase of the unified tax rates for legal entities in the third group to the standard corporate income tax rate (18%) during a three-year transitional period, followed by a complete prohibition for legal entities to remain under the STS.
Second, for individual entrepreneurs, it is proposed to merge the second and third groups into a single group with the introduction of a differentiated rate scale ranging from 3% (for trading activities) to 17% (for high‑margin services). A revision of the list of activities permitted for the first group of individual entrepreneurs is also envisaged, involving the exclusion of certain high‑margin business sectors.
Furthermore, the NRS provides for mandatory VAT registration for all STS taxpayers upon exceeding a certain income threshold. The amount of this threshold—beyond which VAT registration becomes obligatory for simplified‑system taxpayers—is currently the subject of active discussion among government officials, members of parliament and the public (the majority of whom are entrepreneurs under the STS). For instance, the draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine concerning the Registration of Unified Tax Payers as Value Added Tax Payers,” published by the Ministry of Finance on 18 December 2025 for public consultation, proposed introducing mandatory VAT registration as of 1 January 2027 upon reaching an income threshold of UAH 1,000,000.
According to government officials, the STS reform through implementation of the above measures should support the development of micro and small businesses in Ukraine while eliminating opportunities for large companies to distort competition by abusing the benefits of the STS.
However, business associations and experts hold the opposite view. In particular, the Ukrainian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Ukraine) believes that the above measures may have a completely opposite effect.
A gradual increase of unified tax rates for legal entities, followed by a prohibition to use the simplified system, would in practice amount to its complete elimination for this category of taxpayers. This may force tens or even hundreds of thousands of companies to switch to the general taxation system with all its inherent bureaucratic and financial burdens. Meanwhile, revising the list of activities permitted for the first group of individual entrepreneurs and merging the second and third groups with a differentiated rate scale from 3% to 17% could result in a multiple increase of the tax burden for many entrepreneurs, especially in the service and intellectual sectors.
In our view, the STS reform proposed by the Government may lead to a significant narrowing of the scope of the simplified taxation system and a simultaneous increase of both the tax and administrative burdens on entrepreneurs who are already operating under extremely challenging conditions. Such an approach contradicts the original intent and purpose of the simplified system as a tool designed to facilitate small business operations and stimulate its development.
It should be recalled that the simplified taxation system was introduced by Presidential Decree No. 727/98 of 3 July 1998 for the purpose of implementing state policy on the development and support of small enterprises and effectively utilizing their potential for the development of the national economy. In fact, the STS was introduced as an alternative to the general taxation system, which—due to complex and unclear requirements concerning registration, reporting and accounting—pushed entrepreneurs into the shadow economy. Therefore, the STS was viewed as a tool for de‑shadowing economic activity with the aim of achieving positive fiscal effects.
Granting Tax Authorities Access to Banking Information
Attention is drawn to the provisions of the National Strategy concerning the prerequisites for implementing tax reform. Specifically, the NRS stipulates that the STS reform will commence only after implementation of the measures defined in subsection 4.2.3(b) of the NRS – “Data Security and Access to Information on the Amount and Flow of Taxpayers’ Funds in Their Bank Accounts”
This subsection provides for granting tax authorities access to information on the movement of funds in taxpayers’ bank accounts. According to the Government’s concept, such access would enhance analytical capabilities of the tax service, enable the introduction of new services for compliant taxpayers, and facilitate “many other things that are now standard for European tax systems” [direct quote].
However, this prerequisite raises well‑founded concerns, as it effectively implies granting the tax authorities the ability to obtain data on fund movements in the bank accounts of both individuals and legal entities. Such an initiative would establish an unprecedented level of financial surveillance over citizens and businesses, creating significant risks of misuse for the purpose of exerting pressure on entrepreneurs, as well as additional corruption risks.
According to a public statement by a coalition of expert groups and civil society organizations, including the Ukrainian Business Council and the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, implementation of this approach as envisaged by the NRS would in effect mean that tax authorities receive automated access to banking secrecy—without the need to submit formal requests and without any restrictive safeguards. Moreover, granting such access entails considerable risks of abuse and leakage of taxpayers’ personal data.
Collection of Tax Debt by Decision of the Head of the Tax Authority Without a Court Order
Another controversial mechanism proposed to achieve the goals of the NRS is granting tax authorities the power to freeze taxpayers’ accounts and assets without a court order.
Subsection 4.2.2(g) of the NRS provides that between 2025 and 2027 amendments should be developed to legislation and by‑laws allowing, among other things, tax debt recovery based on a decision of the head of the tax authority without a court order, as well as strengthening the administrative powers of tax authorities regarding the collection of tax debts and freezing of accounts (assets) without court approval.
According to the Cabinet of Ministers, as expressed in its response to an electronic petition calling for revision of the NRS, the proposed mechanism of freezing assets without a court order is more efficient and less costly, as it removes the need to apply to the court, thereby reducing unjustified budgetary expenses (court fees are paid from the state budget), decreasing the workload on courts, and enabling faster inflows to the state budget through quicker tax debt collection.
Under the current version of the Tax Code of Ukraine, as a rule, tax debt may be recovered only based on a court decision issued upon review of a tax authority’s claim. An exception applies where the debt arises from unpaid obligations and/or penalties self‑assessed by the taxpayer in tax returns or adjustment calculations. In such cases, recovery of funds from cash or bank accounts is effected by decision of the head (or deputy head or other authorized official) of the tax authority without a court order—provided that the debt remains unpaid for 90 calendar days after the statutory deadline and provided that no outstanding refund obligations of the state exist (or exist in a smaller amount) regarding erroneous or excess payments or VAT refunds.
Thus, under current law, the court functions as the principal safeguard protecting taxpayers from unjustified recovery actions by tax authorities, as it must verify the validity of the tax authority’s claims when such a request is submitted.
In our opinion, the proposed changes create significant prerequisites for abuse by tax authorities and substantially undermine the balance between the fiscal interests of the state and the protection of taxpayers’ rights.
Business associations likewise stress that abolishing judicial oversight over tax debt recovery would effectively grant the tax authority unlimited power to enforce collection without effective safeguards against unlawful actions and corruption risks.
Is Everything So Bad?
Despite the risks and legitimate concerns regarding certain measures planned by the Government to achieve the objectives of the NRS, it should be acknowledged that a number of mechanisms already implemented or under development are important and necessary for the modernization of the national tax system as a whole and for taxpayers in particular.
For example, in late 2024 the State Tax Service of Ukraine, with support from EU4PFM (the EU Public Finance Management Program in Ukraine), developed and implemented a unique IT solution—the “Automated System for Processing Large Data Sets for Transfer Pricing Risk Analysis” (Big Data TP). This system uses modern technologies to analyze risks at macroeconomic, medium, and microeconomic levels, increases voluntary tax compliance, and reduces the influence of the “human factor” in transfer pricing control.
Moreover, as of 1 January 2026, the electronic audit system (E‑audit) was launched. Under this system, instead of submitting dozens of documents, a taxpayer submits a single standardized electronic file—the SAF‑T UA file—which contains information on business transactions, accounting records, assets, tax liabilities, and other primary indicators of the taxpayer’s operations.
The system automatically analyzes structured accounting and tax data, which improves the quality and effectiveness of tax control through automated analysis and testing of tax and financial reporting indicators, identification of inconsistencies and risks, and, most importantly, reduces the impact of the human factor during audit procedures.
Additionally, according to the Head of the State Tax Service of Ukraine, further development of IT solutions and the digital transformation of the tax authorities is planned for 2026–2027 with the support of EU4PFM. In particular, the creation of an automated tax risk management system and the implementation of a CRM system for the Tax Service Contact Center are envisaged, which are critical steps toward establishing a modern, analytically driven tax administration.
Conclusion
In summary, the National Revenue Strategy until 2030 provides for several important and long‑overdue measures whose proper implementation is essential for the modernization of the tax system. At the same time, certain instruments proposed to achieve the NRS objectives contain more potential risks than expected benefits for taxpayers and for the country.
In our view, without revising and substantially refining certain approaches, the Government’s declared goals and the strategic objective of the National Revenue Strategy until 2030 risk remaining purely declarative. Conversely, the practical implementation of high‑risk mechanisms that currently cause legitimate concern among the business community and experts may lead to adverse consequences for economic operators and the overall business climate.
Source: Yurgazeta